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Abstract  
Despite increase mistrust between corporations and societies in the aftermath of 
the global corporate misbehaviours, the literature examining the impact of community 
concerns on corporate communications is undeveloped. Our paper is timely; it 
contributes to the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) by considering the 
impacts of community expectations on Corporate Community Involvement Disclosures 
(CCID) using a ten-year panel study. We advance CSR communication research by 
providing a fresh theoretical perspective - media-agenda-setting theory - to the broad 
CSR debate and the CCID subset of this debate. Our findings support the media-agenda 
theoretical expectation and provide important practice and policy recommendations for 
improving interactions between corporations and their communities. 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature on the interactions between the corporation and its external 
environment points to the importance of achieving congruence between them, and to the roles of 
effective communication in finding a fit between corporate action and corporate community 
approval (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Islam and Deegan, 2010; Suchman, 1995; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996).  Understanding the link between community expectations and corporate community 
involvement disclosures (CCIDs) is important for many stakeholders in the corporate environment. 
This is because clarity on this link could enhance the interactions between the firm and its 
community and facilitates firms’ access to societal resources due to enhanced legitimacy. Despite 
the acknowledgements in the literature of the importance of communication, the literature examining 
the impact of community expectations on corporate communications is very undeveloped (Islam and 
Deegan, 2010; Deegan et al., 2002). In an attempt to address this gap, this study departs from the 
bulk of the literature in this space by adopting the lens of the media agenda-setting theory to 
investigate the impact of community expectations on CCID.  
Using the media agenda-setting theory in providing explanations for the role of community 
expectations in corporate voluntary disclosures helps us to integrate two important research areas 
that are currently considered separately - Social communication and corporate voluntary disclosures. 
In particular, we used the literature on social communication and media agenda-setting to enrich the 
literature on corporate voluntary disclosure, especially voluntary CCIDs. This is an important, yet 
overlooked aspect of the corporate disclosure literature. Moreover, the recent global corporate 
governance (CG) and financial crises provide a suitable opportunity to test whether corporate 
communications might indeed be insensitive to community expectations. This is because the 
consequences of the crises may be perceived to have inadvertently created a gap between corporate 
social performance as reported in the annual reports of companies and community expectations. This 
implies a situation whereby corporate behaviour has fallen below societal expectations of what is 
acceptable. According to Suchman (1995), this is an example of a disconnection between the firm 
and its community, which could challenge firms’ continued legitimacy in the society. Suchman 
(1995) also argues that firms need to address this gap through a number of means including 
improving communication with its conferring publics.  Yekini et al., (2015, p. 251) further argue 
that the ‘firm needs to strengthen its societal acceptance through effective interaction with the 
society in which it operates’. Consequently, the main objective of this study is to examine whether 
and how community expectations influence CCIDs.  
We achieved this through a carefully constructed panel data of UK listed companies over a 
10-year period from 2003-2012. The scope of the study covers both the CG and financial crises, 
allowing us to generate a deeper understanding of the effects of these events on corporate disclosure 
practices. Our study investigates whether the ensuing communications were a direct response to 
aggravated community expectations or if corporate disclosures in the annual reports are insensitive 
to such expectations. We undertook the study in the UK FTSE 350 Index, with a sample of 80 firms 
representing all industries on the exchange. We examined them over a ten-year period, thus having 
800 firm-year observations. We collected data on CCID from the annual reports of the sampled 
companies as well as from articles on community issues published in print and electronic media 
from over 40,000 legal, news and business sources across the globe.  These allowed us to provide 
additional international evidence on the determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure where 
principles rather than rules motivate compliance with disclosure requirements. 
This study directly contributes to the literature on corporate voluntary disclosures, especially 
CCIDs. Whilst previous studies (Campbell et al., 2006; Bebbington et al., 2008; Toms, 2002; 
Hasseldine et al., 2005; Yekini and Jallow, 2012) have examined different determinants of corporate 
disclosure, we extend the literature by considering the impacts of community expectations on 
corporate voluntary disclosures. This is an important question in the context of the increased mistrust 
between corporations and societies in the aftermath of the recent global corporate misbehaviours. 
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We also make methodological contributions to the literature on voluntary corporate social 
disclosure. Previous studies concentrate on either a cross sectional analysis (Adams et al., 1998; 
Deegan et al., 2000) or a trend analysis of selected cases (Campbell, 2000) or the use of limited 
number of years (Watson et al., 2002). In contrast, our study uses panel data analysis, which 
combines both the cross sectional and the time series elements in a data, therefore allowing a more 
robust analysis (Jizi et al., 2014). Furthermore, nonparametric statistical analysis dominates the vast 
majority of extant studies in this area. Nonparametric techniques are generally less efficient than 
parametric analysis, even with normally distributed data (Bryman and Bell, 2007). We analysed the 
nexus between CCID and community expectation using advanced parametric techniques (i.e. panel 
data regression models). Vickers (2005) produces evidence that parametric techniques give more 
efficient results than their nonparametric equivalents.  
We structured the rest of the paper as follows: the next section provides a review of relevant 
literature as well as the media agenda-setting theory, which helps to formulate our hypothesis. 
Section three describes the methodology adopted in the study. We discussed the findings in section 
four, while section five concludes the study, with some recommendations for future research.  
 
 
2. Previous studies, theory and hypothesis 
 
2.1.CSR and CSR Disclosure 
The extant literature has addressed several aspects of the CSR debate, including its historical 
development (Patten, 2013), motivation (Amaeshi, Adegbite and Rajwani, 2016) and types (Halme 
and Laurila, 2009) in varieties of capitalism. However, the boundary around the meaning and scope 
of what could be defined as CSR is severely blurred and it is increasingly difficult to agree on a 
generally acceptable definition of CSR. Despite the contentions, a number of descriptions and 
explanations serve as the basis for further discussions, and provide grounds for operationalising the 
concept in an empirical analysis. According to Halme and Laurila (2009: 237), corporate 
responsibility is the “policies and activities that go beyond mandatory obligations such as economic 
responsibility (being profitable) and legal responsibility (obeying the legislation and adhering to 
regulations).”  McWilliams and Siegel (2001:117) defined CSR as “actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.” These 
definitions highlight the altruistic dimension of CSR and show that CSR refers to what organisations 
do willingly beyond the primary objective of maximising profits and the requirements of law and 
regulations, for the benefits of their stakeholders. 
Companies often disclose the extent of their CSR activities and as such, a significant number 
of studies have addressed the probity (Bachmann and Ingenhoff, 2016; Morsing, Schultz, and 
Nielsen 2008), medium and methods (Brown et al., 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Patten, 2012; Patten 
and Zhao 2014) of CSR disclosure.  Whilst studies such as Morsing et al., (2008) cautioned firms 
on the communication of their CSR activities, other studies suggest that disclosure reduces firms’ 
cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011), and impacts firms’ legitimacy (Deegan, 2002). Due to 
increasing disclosure by companies, the scope of what constitutes CSR has expanded significantly 
overtime beyond the popular characterisation encompassing legal, economic, social and 
philanthropic responsibilities (Carroll, 1991).  A number of recent studies have provided more 
nuance examples of what constitute CSR including for example, employee, human and 
environmental rights, and anticorruption efforts (Healy and Serafeim 2013; Beatty and Liao 2013; 
Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011), and more recently institutional entrepreneurship and filling of 
institutional voids (Amaeshi, et. al., 2016).  An aspect of the CSR classifications that has enjoyed 
less attention in the CSR discourse both in terms of its essence and disclosure is the corporate 
community involvement activities.   
5 
 
 
2.2.Corporate Community Involvement 
Corporate community involvement (CCI) or what Rehbein and Schuler (2015: 794) referred 
to as ‘corporate community program’ is the participation of businesses in societal initiatives in a bid 
to meet the needs of the communities in which they operate (Yekini et al., 2015; Moon and Muthuri, 
2006). It is far more than donations and charitable activities but includes granting stakeholders 
access to company’s infrastructure, human resources and business activity. It entails committing 
significant time and company’s resources to community projects. CCI is different from other 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) types because whilst these may be driven by the need to redress 
the negative externalities arising from a firm’s operations, CCIs are distinct in their altruistic motives 
(Yekini et al., 2015).  CCIs are characterised by actual involvement in the life of the society and the 
engagement of corporation in civic duties within their community of operation [1] (Moon and 
Muthuri, 2006).  The historical antecedents of CCI also make it distinctive from other CSR 
initiatives.  Corporate involvement in societal life pre-dates current notions of CSR. Gilchrist (2003) 
observe that corporations were fundamental part of the fabrics of society in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. There were palpable connections between the firm and the society, and it was 
common for corporations to make their resources accessible to the society in which they operate. 
However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, there were noticeable gaps in corporate 
engagements with the society. This disconnect became even more apparent due to the devastating 
effects of the war. Especially, many national governments were unable to, unilaterally, address the 
consequences of the war, and relied heavily on corporations, as partners. Thus, in summary, unlike 
the broad CSR concept, CCI is a distinct and unique type of corporate engagement with its 
community and has a long historical note of corporations’ tangible involvements and interactions 
with their society of operation (Rehbein and Schuler, 2015).  
A growing number of studies (Campbell et al., 2006; Yekini et al., 2015; Rehbein and Schuler, 
2015; Peloza and Falkenberg, 2009) have recognized the uniqueness of CCI activities and their 
difference to other types of CSR activities, because of their external outlook and their tangible 
interaction with the firms’ external community. In this sense, Rehbein and Schuler (2015:796) note 
that corporate community programs (CCP) are “externally focused and explicitly intended to address 
a range of social issues, including community poverty, educational deficits, environment, and human 
health.”  A number of these studies also argue that CCID is grossly under-researched “despite its 
importance as a broadly conceived stake-holder group (Campbell et al., 2006, p. 97). A related and 
possibly a more fundamental issue with the broad CSR debate, and in particular the scanty CCI 
literature, is the lack of adequate theorisation (Basu and Palazzo, 2008), and limited conceptual basis 
beyond the traditional theoretical framework such as stakeholder and legitimacy theories, that have 
dominated CSR discourse.  In addressing this, the next sub-section discusses the media agenda-
setting theory, and develops the study’s hypothesis. 
 
2.3.Media Agenda-Setting Theory 
A growing number of studies (Basu and Palazzo, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Hooghiemstra, 2000) have called for new theoretical perspectives to enhance the quality of the CSR 
literature. In particular, theoretical underpinnings from adjoining social science fields, including 
psychology, media studies, anthropology, sociology and politics can help to enrich our collective 
understanding of the broader CSR debate. This study uses media agenda setting theory to generate 
deeper insights into the role of the media in CCID.  
Media agenda-setting theory has its roots in the work of McCombs and Shaw (1972) who 
suggested that people do not respond directly to events in the real world but that their reactions to 
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events depend on the image furnished by the media. The theory proposes that the media create 
meanings and knowledge for the society, and set the stage for the content of its discourse, and the 
perception of the population on issues. It focuses on the explanations of the rise and fall of social, 
political, and economic issues in the media and public policies (McCombs et al., 2014; Weaver et 
al., 1981; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The theory suggests that there is a strong direct correlation 
between media agenda and issues salience in the public opinion (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2014; 
Dearing and Roger, 1996; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). This implies that the media choices about 
the importance or otherwise of an issue or debate reflect highly on what ultimately becomes the most 
important issue to the public (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2014). The theory also implies that although an 
issue may enjoy wide publicity and attention elsewhere, its selection in the media is a conscious and 
calculated decision by specific media outlets (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). This is because the 
media do not have unlimited space, airtime or ‘web-space’ to accommodate news (Gans, 1979; 
Korthagen, 2015) and therefore take strategic decisions on which news item to feature and how to 
report them. In other words, the media influences public discourse through their selection and 
framing of news items.  
Thus, the media play an influential role in developing the image and perceptions created in 
people’s mind. This means that the media has the power to mediate audiences’ attention and 
problematise issues that consequently form the basis of public discourse. In this light, and as early 
as 1963, Cohen (1963, p.13) observe that the media ‘may not be successful much of the time in 
telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think 
about’. This statement supports the perception that the media is very influential in managing social 
actors’ cognitive processes. However, in his critique of the media agenda setting hypothesis, Entman 
(1989, p.349) argues that ‘nobody, no force, can successfully tell people what to think’.  He further 
argues that, irrespective of the medium of control or method of disseminating the message, ‘control 
over others’ thinking can never be complete’ (p.349). He argues that the interaction between the 
media and public opinion generated through this process showed the interdependence between the 
parties. On the other hand, proponents of the media agenda-setting theory contend that the media 
has substantial influence on what audience think, arguing that there is a direct relationship between 
media agenda setting and issue salience in the public domain. This view is consistent with McCombs 
and Shaw’s (1972) conclusion that the main effect of the news media is agenda setting, because they 
tell people what to think about and how to think about it. Similarly, McCombs (2000) concludes that 
‘the power of the news media to set a nation's agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public 
issues, is an immense and well documented influence’ (p. 1).  
 
2.3.1. Media Agenda Setting, Public Expectations and the Corporation  
 Evidence from previous studies (Wanta et al., 2004; Ader, 1995; Fang and Peress, 2009; 
Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Brown and Deegan, 1998) on agenda setting theory supports the 
perceptions of a positive correlation between media coverage and public expectation on issues. 
These include studies in politics and elections (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), foreign policies (Wanta 
et al., 2004), pollution (Ader, 1995), environmental performance (Aerts and Cormier, 2009), stock 
market performance (Fang and Peress, 2009) and health (Nerlich and Halliday, 2007).  According 
to Brown and Deegan (1998: 25) “in terms of causality, increased media attention is believed to lead 
to increased community concern for a particular issue”. Similarly, Aerts and Cormier (2009: 3) assert 
that; “Media research within the agenda-setting paradigm (Carroll & McCombs, 2003; McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972) demonstrates a close alignment between the content of public media and public 
opinion (or the degree of salience that different topics have for the general public), corroborating 
the assertion that public media are actively involved in public impression construction processes”. 
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Furthermore, Nerlich and Halliday (2007) focused on how media coverage generates 
community expectations. The authors argued that media coverage has performative force on 
different actors within the society. This implies that news items and the linguistic attributes of their 
media coverage which lead to community expectations also elicit response from their recipients.  
This idea of the performative force of the media coverage on issues is consistent with an increasing 
number of recent literature which sees the media as part of the institutional legitimisation process in 
the society. For example, according to Aerts and Cormier (2009:3) the media is “an institutional 
intermediary” that specialises in the dissemination of information to organisations, and the 
evaluation of their contributions to the society. Consequently, the media has the power to facilitate 
corporate legitimacy due to its believability, reach and resources, since it provides a mean through 
which the public filters its perceptions on issues, arriving at a common impression irrespective of 
the variety of views (Aerts and Cormier, 2009).  
However, while the media is important in the corporate legitimisation process through its 
performative force, it also requires societal legitimacy based on the symbolic social contracts 
between organisations and the society in which they operate (Suchman, 1995: Islam and Deegan, 
2010).  This implies that the relationship between the media, corporations and the society is dynamic, 
iterative and mutually dependent.  In this sense, whilst the media coverage of a pertinent issue may 
lead to the generation of expectation which elicits action from corporations, corporate activities are 
also capable of generating media coverage which could further shape public opinion (see Figure 1 
for illustration), yet the issues of media regulation and accountability remain highly contentious (van 
der Wurff and Schonback, 2014; Brants and De Haan, 2010). Thus, it is probably impossible to 
adequately tease out the intricate relationships amongst the corporation, society and the media in 
just one study. Consequently, the current study focuses only on the impacts of community 
expectation on CCID. The next section motivates the study’s hypothesis. 
 
2.3.2. Media Agenda-Setting Theory and CCI 
In the context of a firm’s community of operation, and the role of the media in agenda setting 
in CCI activities, previous studies (Ader, 1995; Brown and Deegan, 1998; O’Donovan, 1999; 
Deegan et al., 2002) show that the media usually generate public awareness on issues. They argue 
that the attention the media give to a particular issue could lead to public awareness and expectations 
(Deegan et al., 2002). Accordingly, Deegan et al., (2002, p.314), the ‘media are not seen as mirroring 
public priorities; rather they are seen as shaping them’.  
Furthermore, Ader (1995) argues that the public requires the media to inform them of the 
importance of an issue to help them form their opinion. In other words, the awareness of an issue 
through the media will normally precipitate the development of community expectations. For 
instance, Ader (1995) finds that media coverage on pollution has a direct effect on the importance 
attached to it by the public. O’Donovan (1999) finds that corporate management is aware that media 
publicity can affect public perception and therefore uses disclosure in annual reports to shape public 
perception.  Similarly, Deegan et al., (2002) find that the issues that attracted the largest media 
coverage also represented the largest disclosed issues in BHP annual reports between 1983 and 1997.  
They argue that these issues attracted such a level of disclosure because management perceived that 
they have generated community expectations to which management is obliged to respond.  These 
studies suggest a direct positive relationship between media coverage and issue salience as reflected 
in increased public expectations. Against this background, we argue that since media coverage 
influences the awareness of the community-stakeholders’ group to concerns within the community, 
and due to the performative force in the coverage, companies respond to the perceived increased 
concern and community expectations through increase disclosure in order to retain/maintain 
corporate legitimacy. The media agenda-setting theory also precludes the possibility of a firm to 
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self-select its coverage in the media through event such as press briefing or press announcement. 
This is because media houses take deliberate and calculated decision on which news item to feature 
(Korthagen, 2015; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007; Gans, 1979). Furthermore, based on the agenda-
setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), and given Deegan et al., (2002) evidence of a positive 
relationship between media coverage and the extent of the coverage of an issue in corporate 
disclosure, it can be argued that a positive relationship subsists between community expectations 
and CCIDs as companies respond to increased expectations from their communities of operation.  
Therefore, our hypothesis is formally presented and depicted in Figure 1:  
 
Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between the volume of CCID and community   
expectations. 
 
[<<<<Figure 1 about here>>>>] 
 
 
In testing this hypothesis, we controlled for the effects of CG variables and other firm-specific 
characteristics based on the literature as presented next.  
 
2.3.3. Control variables 
Board size has featured in several previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Wilson and Lombardi, 
2001). Board size could facilitate diversity in the board’s deliberations (Song and Windram, 2004), 
especially as it may enhance the representation of community interests on the board which may 
prevent groupthink on issues (Yekini et al., 2015). Such community representatives could therefore 
provide a link between the firm and the community of operation, allowing the firm to have a deeper 
understanding of community concerns. Previous studies have reported mixed findings on the 
relationship between board size and voluntary corporate disclosure. Studies such as Wilson and 
Lombardi (2001) and Webb (2004) report a positive relationship. On the other hand, Yermack 
(1996) and Song and Windram (2004) report a negative relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and board size.  We anticipate a positive relationship between board size and the extent of CCID, 
since larger board may have the manpower to ensure corporate monitoring relating to disclosure [2] 
(Webb, 2004).  
Board meeting frequency is indicative of its activeness and diligence (Cormier et al., 2010).  
Frequent board meetings could allow effective oversight functions on the type, nature and content 
of corporate communications, including CCID.  Diligent boards, through frequent meetings, are in 
a better position to understand community expectations and act upon them compared to boards that 
rarely meet. Previous studies report conflicting results in respect of the relationship between board 
meeting frequency and voluntary disclosures. For example, Evans et al. (2002) report a negative 
relationship between board meeting frequency and voluntary disclosures, while Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) report a positive relationship.  We anticipate a positive relationship on the argument 
that boards that meet more frequently enhance corporate disclosure.  
Board independence is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. Board independence is crucial because it is expected that it will 
enhance directors’ objectivity and ability to protect the interests of shareholders in boards’ decisions. 
Previous studies (Webb, 2004; Ajinkya et al., 2005) report a positive relationship between board 
independence and voluntary disclosures [3]. In terms of CCID, we also expect a positive relationship 
because CCIDs are indicative of the interactions between the firm and its community of operation 
and they are therefore likely to enhance directors’ individual and collective reputation and human 
capital worth.   
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Furthermore, the unitary board system in the UK functions with the help of a number of board 
level committees, which support the activities of the main board. It is now commonplace for UK 
companies to have audit, nominations, remuneration, risk management, and some have disclosure 
and CSR committees. However, with the exception of the audit committee, there are limited studies 
on the impacts of the board level committees on corporate activities such as corporate voluntary 
disclosures, despite their potential to influence corporate transparency and accountability to various 
stakeholders. We controlled for the presence of risk management as well as disclosure and CSR 
committees for their direct relevance to CCID and to start to redress the lack of attention given to 
other board level committees in corporate disclosure studies. We anticipate positive relationships 
between the presence of these board level committees and the volume of CCID.  
On firm size, previous studies report a positive relationship between firm size and voluntary 
disclosures (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Adams et al., 1998; Campbell et al., 2006; Garcia-Castro et 
al., 2010). Large firms have the resources to make voluntary disclosures, they have more visible 
presence in the community and their impacts are more likely to be noticeable than smaller firms.  
Based on this as well as the evidence from previous studies, we anticipate a positive relationship 
between firm size and the volume of CCID. Consistent with Hackston and Milne (1996), we measure 
firm size as the log of market capitalisation.  
On firm performance, the relationship between firm performance and corporate disclosure is 
ambiguous. For example, whilst some studies report positive relations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), 
others have reported negative or no relationship at all (Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Profitable firms are in a better position to make additional voluntary disclosures compared to poor 
performing firms (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Bebbington et al., 2008) because they can afford it, and 
they have a good news7 factor that could motivate additional voluntary disclosure compared to poor 
performing firms. Based on this as well as previous findings, we anticipate a positive relationship 
between firm performance and volume of CCID.   
On leverage, previous studies (Mangena and Pike, 2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Garcia-Castro 
et al., 2010) argue that disclosure is sensitive to corporate leverage. Creditors prefer additional 
relevant information to less because more disclosure enhances corporate transparency and increases 
creditors’ confidence (Mangena and Pike, 2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). More CCID can further 
enhance corporate transparency, since the cost of borrowing is likely to be different for firms, based 
on their level of transparency (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). In view of this, we anticipate a positive 
relationship between firms’ leverage and the volume of CCID. 
On age, consistent with previous studies (Li et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), we 
anticipate that older firms are likely to enjoy enhanced corporate status and confidence. This could 
boost corporate reputation than younger firms who may be relatively unknown and less trusted (Li 
et al., 2008).  Furthermore, firms with long listing age are likely to have developed a clear strategy 
for corporate communication and are therefore more likely to consider CCID important.  Previous 
studies (Li et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) report positive relationships between firms’ listing 
age and volume of corporate communications. Consistent with these arguments, we anticipate a 
positive relationship between firms’ listing age and volume of CCID. 
Finally, we controlled for the influence of other CSR disclosures (CSRD). Studies such as 
Toms (2002); Hasseldine et al., (2005); and Bebbington et al., (2008) all argue that reputation 
management is one of the key motivations for CSRD. For instance, Toms (2002) argue that CSR 
activity is an intangible asset and that its disclosure can help to build environmental reputation and 
reports an association between CSRD and corporate environmental reputation. Hence, as managers 
are inadvertently pressured to produce CSR reports in order to show their firms’ social responsibility 
and thus improve corporate image, they are likely to report social responsibility across all CSR 
themes including CCID.  We therefore anticipate a positive relationship between the disclosure of 
other CSR issues and CCID. 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1.Sample and Data 
This study focuses on a sample of FTSE 350 companies. We used the FTSE350 index because 
it is representative of the spread of industries in the UK. We classify the companies on the FTSE 
350 into ten strata, using the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) structure and code index. 
The ten industries include Oil and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer goods, Health care, 
Consumer services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials and Technology. We draw our 
sample from all the industries to ensure representation and enhance the reliability of the 
investigation.  Our sample contained only companies on the London Stock Exchange as at January 
2003 and that have all the required data for the variables in our model to ensure a balanced panel. 
We randomly selected ten companies from each industrial sector. We used all the companies in a 
sector if the sector has less than ten companies. This leaves us with a final sample of 80 companies, 
which we followed for a ten-year period from 2003-2012. This gives 800 firm-year observations 
which were used in this study.  
We collected data on CCID from the annual reports of the sampled companies and measured 
the volume of CCID through the number of word counts on CCI activities. We used the number of 
articles on community issues published in print media available on the Lexis-Nexis Library for the 
period of the study to proxy for community expectations. This library provided access to a large 
database of searchable up-to-date documents from over 40,000 legal, news and business sources 
across the globe. We collected all the other data used in the study from DataStream and from the 
annual reports where this was not available on DataStream. 
We used content analysis to derive both our dependent variable and the measure of community 
expectations variable. Content analysis ‘is a systematic and objective means of describing and 
quantifying phenomena’ (Elo and Kyngas, 2008: 108). As a research technique, content analysis has 
enabled us to make ‘replicable and valid inferences from texts ... to the contexts of their use’ 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p.18). A number of studies in accounting and finance (Guthrie et al., 2004; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Milne and Adler, 1999; Hooks and van Staden, 2011) have used content 
analysis both as a method of collecting and analysing data. This method has also been used in diverse 
ways to analyse narrative contents in annual reports. These include: sentence count (Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Deegan et al., 2000); word count (Adams et al., 1998; Campbell et al., 2006) and 
constructing quality score index (Freedman and Stagliano, 2008; Yekini et al., 2015). The outputs 
from content analysis have been found to be valid and reliable especially when coding instruments 
are used with well specified decision rules and coding categories of information (Milne and Adler, 
1999).  
Content analysis was particularly useful in this study as it allowed for the construction of 
analytical categories of the contents of CCID in each annual report and, thus, allowed quantitative 
analyses. We defined the coding categories as precisely as possible with clear decision-rules and 
criteria. This is to ensure that the categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and that 
classifications into categories are not discretionary (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Bryman and Bell, 
2007), thereby allowing for reproducibility. Coding was done over several months by two 
experienced researchers. We used inter-coder rating to reduce subjectivity and to improve validity 
(Krippendorff, 2004) [4]. While differences in individual experiences and orientation may make 
coding difficult despite clarity in coding instructions, we followed Milne and Adler’s (1999) 
suggestions that maintaining very clear and tested decision rules and comparability over time lead 
to consistency in coding thereby improving accuracy and believability of the investigation.  
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3.2. Measurements  
The dependent variable is the volume of CCID in annual reports, while the main independent 
variable is community expectations. Although companies also report their CCI activities using 
alternative avenues including standalone sustainability reports (Thorne et al., 2014), consistent with 
Yekini et al., (2015), our study focused on the disclosure in the annual report because it is the most 
reliable and statutorily required means of communication by companies to their various stakeholders 
(Jenkins and Yakovlena, 2006). Furthermore, even where firms communicate their social 
information through other means, they also provide similar information in their annual reports. We 
also focused on the annual report because standalone and other avenues of social disclosures are not 
standardised. In particular, firms disclose in them as they wish and these alternative avenues may 
suffer from credibility issues, because unlike annual reports, companies do not have to audit their 
social disclosures (Jenkins and Yakovlena, 2006). Coupland (2006) also expressed concerns that 
separating financial information from social information could create distance in these sources of 
information and give prominence to financial information over social disclosure. Furthermore, our 
coding results of a sample of both annual and standalone reports were similar, supporting our 
decision to focus on the annual report.  
Moreover, we measure CCID in terms of its volume for a number of reasons. Firstly, the debate 
on a superior disclosure measure is inconclusive (Botosan, 2004; Beattie et al., 2004; Hasseldine et 
al., 2005, Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Yekini and Jallow, 2012). Secondly, in deciding to use 
disclosure volume, we were guided by the fact that the fundamental criterion in deciding the 
appropriate measurement approach should be the study’s objective (Gray et al., 1995; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Guthrie et al., 2003 & 2004). The focus of our investigation was on the preponderance 
of CCID and news in the media and whether these generate disclosure expectations on listed firms 
in the UK.   
 We measured volume of CCI disclosed in annual reports using word count as the unit of 
measurement (Campbell et al., 2006). We considered the volume of disclosure as the total disclosure 
on community activities. We copied and pasted these disclosures into a Word document in order to 
count the number of words used, using Microsoft Software – Word documents. We considered 
disclosures on community involvement based on the theme in the disclosure or if a statement 
contains community and/or social involvement. We considered any statement reporting any form of 
community sponsorship activities, or any sponsorship of schools, health, arts and sporting activities 
as CCID. We also considered all employee involvements with the community as CCID, if the 
company’s support is apparent, in addition to business-in-the-community award/secondment of 
staff. However, we considered only expressly stated disclosure and did not assume disclosure if not 
clearly stated.  Furthermore, we did not consider any statement indicating that the company’s 
community activity complies with governmental regulatory standards as disclosure to ensure that 
disclosure remains voluntary. Similarly, we did not include the disclosure of political or charitable 
donations in the directors’ report since they are mandatory disclosures.   
Consistent with previous studies, and as discussed in the last section, we measured community 
expectation with reference to media coverage on community issues. Accordingly, we obtained word 
counts of all relevant articles in the print media mentioning corporate involvement in community 
related issues such as community development, healthcare, the arts and educational sponsorship and 
scholarships from 2003 to 2012 from the LexisNexis Library. To ensure an adequate reflection of 
media coverage on community issues, we used all UK national and regional newspapers having 
wide circulations and present in the database from 2003 to 2012 (Appendix A).  We recognise the 
lag between media coverage of an issue and firms’ response by introducing a lag into our model to 
account for this reaction time in addition to using the variables contemporaneously.  
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3.3.Estimation Model 
We used a fixed effect (FE) model suitable for the panel nature of our data. FE models assume 
that the time invariant unobservable heterogeneity variable is unique to each firm and these are 
consolidated in the model’s intercept.  This ensures that only time variant factors account for the 
changes in the dependent variable (Greene, 2008).  
In addition to these assumptions however, we carried out further post-estimation tests to 
examine the validity of the FE assumptions and its efficiency in dealing with the problems of 
heteroskedasticity by performing the Hausman test (see Appendix B). The results of the Hausman 
test support the use of the FE model by rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the random effect model. Our main model with all the variables is as 
follows: 
 
LnCCIDit = α0 + β1LnCOMNEWSit-1 + β2BODMETit + β3BODCOMPit + β4BODSIZit +  
                     β5RISKCOMit + β6DISCOMit + β7CSRCOMit + β8LnOTHCSRDit +  
                     β9LnMCAPit + β10ROEit + β11LEVit + β12AGEit + Єit ---------------------------------(Eq.1) 
 
The definitions of the variables in this model are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
[<<<<Table 1 about here>>>>] 
 
 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
 
4.1.Summary Statistics 
Tables 2 and 3 present the summary statistics for our sample. In Table 2, on average, firms 
disclosed 476 words on CCID per year. The disclosures range from 0 to a maximum of 3271, while 
1900 words were disclosed for other CSR themes such as human resources, environmental issues, 
amongst others, with disclosures ranging from 0 to a maximum of 12400 words.  
 
 
[<<<<Table 2 about here>>>>] 
 
 
The print media used an average of 7300 words per year to report on community issues during 
the sample period. On average, the board members of most of the companies sampled comprised of 
62% non-executive directors (BODCOMP). This is similar to 68% board independence reported by 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). The average firm in the sample has ten directors on the board. Board 
meeting frequency (BODMET) ranged from 3 to 16 meetings with most companies having an 
average of 8 meetings per year. Market capitalisation for companies sampled ranged between £6m 
and £162bn with the average in the region of £9bn. The distribution of market capitalisation statistics 
suggests that the sample represents a wide range of companies of different sizes. This is important 
for representation and reliability of the study.  Furthermore, the performance measure (ROE) was 
approximately 16% for most companies in the sample. Gearing ratio for most companies was in the 
region of 39.5%. The average listing age of companies in the sample was approximately 23 years 
with some as old as 65 years. On average, 33% of sampled companies had a CSR committee, while 
22% had a disclosure committee and 31% had a standalone risk committee during the period covered 
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in the study.  Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk tests confirmed the absence of extreme Skewness and 
Kurtosis, and showed that the data is normally distributed.  
 
 
 
[<<<<Table 3 about here>>>>] 
 
 
4.2.Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows a low correlation between the explanatory variables. 
Although market capitalisation (MCAP) shows a slightly high positive correlation of 0.54 with 
BODSIZ, this is below the threshold of 0.80 often considered problematic for empirical analysis 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  Nevertheless, since a degree of multi-collinearity may still occur 
with slightly high correlation and could affect confidence intervals for coefficients which tend to 
become very wide and, hence, affect the t-statistics and the significance levels of variables 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007), we computed the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all variables. 
This helps to further check whether multi-collinearity was an issue and if so whether or not it was 
severe. Chatterjee and Price (1991) argue that VIFs in excess of 10 are symptomatic of multi-
collinearity problem. However, we recorded the highest VIF of 2.44 for our models, suggesting no 
multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
[<<<<Table 4 about here>>>>] 
 
 
4.3.Regression Results 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present our regression results. We ran several variations of our main model 
using the robust standard error to ensure rigour and reliability of our findings. With these results we 
were able to test our hypothesis and our expectations of the control variables.  
 
4.3.1. Community expectation and CCID.  
 
We examined the relationship between community expectation and CCID. We test this 
relationship using both the one-year lag community news (LnCOMNEWSt-1) variable and the 
contemporaneous relationship between them. Model 1 in Table 4 presents the result of the regression 
with the contemporaneous measure of community news, LnCOMNEWS, as the independent 
variable of concern. The results (coeff 0.64; t-stat 4.32) show that there is a significant positive 
relationship, at 1% level, between the volume of CCID and community expectations, proxy by 
LnCOMNEWS. This supports our hypothesis of a positive relationship between community 
expectations and corporate community disclosure. This seems to indicate that firms respond to 
increased community expectation through increased corporate community involvement disclosures.   
However, to explore the relationship between CCID and community expectation further, and 
recognising the lag in the response by firms to community expectations, we introduced a lag in the 
model. Thus model 2 in Table 4 presents the result of this relationship. The result (coeff, 0.28; t-stat, 
1.99), is generally similar to model 1 in terms of a significant positive relationship although at 5% 
level and a lower co-efficient value compared to model 1. The result reinforces our conjecture that 
firms respond to legitimacy gap with the society through increased community related disclosure.  
Models 3 and 4 are slightly different from models 1 and 2 because they include other CSR 
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disclosures as additional independent variable. We included this variable to explore the impact of 
other CSR disclosures that firms make on the relationship between CCID and community 
expectations. The inclusion of this variable did not change the relationship between our main 
variables of concern in any significant way, although the coefficients dropped/(improved) in 
magnitude in model 3/(model 4) respectively.  Consequently, these findings seem to support our 
hypothesis of a significant positive relationship between CCID and community expectations.  
From the media agenda-setting theory perspective, one plausible explanation for these findings 
is that CCID in annual reports might have been influenced by print media coverage on community 
issues. This could also imply that management responds positively to the expectations of their 
community stakeholders and these responses are reflected in their disclosure in the annual reports. 
The findings support the perception that firms target their voluntary disclosures and make additional 
disclosure only on its merits and to address their legitimacy gaps, in this case, community 
expectations. The findings also support the argument that firms consider corporate disclosure as a 
strategic tool.  Bebbington et al., (2008) note that firms consider additional disclosure based on their 
importance. However, as noted in section 2.3.1, our study, using media agenda setting, explores a 
salient dimension in the intricate multiple dimensional relationships between the corporation, the 
community and the media. It is therefore quite possible that the corporation could in turn influence 
the content, action and behaviour of the media.  
 
 
4.3.2. CCID and corporate governance (CG) variables.  
We also examined the relationship between CCID and CG (board size, board meeting and 
board independence respectively) variables in the study. We anticipate a significant positive 
relationship between these variables and CCID.  The results from model 1 in Table 4 show a positive 
relationship between CCID and board size but this is not statistically significant at the conventional 
levels.  This is similar to the results in models 2, 3, and 4 in Table 4. The results suggest that board 
size is inconsequential in CCID. Previous studies have reported inconclusive results regarding the 
role of board size in corporate voluntary disclosures. The lack of significant relationship between 
board size and CCID is consistent with the argument of Song and Windram, (2004), and Yermack, 
(1996) that large board size could be counterproductive, and the lack of statistical significant 
relationship reported supports the argument that board size does not impact firms’ activities, in this 
instance, corporate voluntary disclosure.  
Furthermore, we controlled for board meeting frequency. Overall, the results in models 1-4 of 
Table 4 show a consistent significant positive relationship between board meeting frequency and 
CCID. This means that increase in CCID is associated with increase in board meeting frequency. 
However, the relationship is only statistically significant at 10% level in models 1 and 2 and 
insignificant in models 3 and 4. These findings highlight the inconclusive results that characterise 
several CG variables.  
 Consistent with our expectations, the results in models 1-4 in Table 4 show a consistent and 
significant positive relationship between board independence and CCID at 1% and 5% levels. These 
results indicate that increase in the number of non-executive directors relative to executive directors 
on the board is associated with increased CCID. The result supports the conjecture that non-
executive directors represent the interest of the firms’ stakeholders including the community of 
operation and this is consistent with the findings in Yekini et al., (2015) where they argued that non-
executive directors represent wider interests on the board. The result is also consistent with the 
argument that non-executive directors are keen to protect their human capital worth and this can be 
enhanced through increased communication with a firm’s community of operation. The positive 
relationship is also consistent with reported findings in Webb (2004) and Ajinkya, et al., (2005).  
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4.3.3. CCID and CG board level committees.  
We examined the relationship between the presence of a number of board level committees 
such as risk management, disclosure and CSR committees on CCID as control variables. We 
anticipated a positive relationship between these committees and CCID but our results in models 1-
4 in Table 4 show a negative relationship. Furthermore, only disclosure committee shows 
statistically significant relationship with CCID at 1% level. A possible explanation for these results 
is that the committees are probably concerned more about the remits of their respective committees’ 
responsibilities which may preclude CCI. The risk management and CSR committees would be 
concerned about risk management and its communication and expectedly, the CSR committee may 
focus more on the broad themes rather than a more specific issue such as CCI. The disclosure 
committee on the other hand will most likely have a broad remit on all disclosures and increased 
attention on mandatory and other voluntary disclosures which may preclude attention of the 
committee in respect of CCID.   
 
4.3.4. CCID and firm specific variables.  
 
We controlled for four firm specific characteristics (size, performance, leverage and age) in 
the study. The regression results in models 1-4 presented in Table 4 show that, consistent with our 
expectations, there is a significant positive relationship between firm size and the volume of CCID. 
This is significant at 1% level and supports the findings in studies such as Ho and Wong (2001) and 
Campbell et al., (2006). Larger firms seem to have higher visibility and higher social pressure for 
disclosure compared to small sized companies. 
The results in models 1-4 of Table 4 do not support our expectation of a positive relationship 
between firm performance and the volume of CCID. The results show a persistent negative but 
statistically insignificant relationship between firm performance and CCID, except in model 1. 
Previous studies have expressed concerns over the inconclusive nature of the relationship between 
firm performance and corporate disclosure variables in general. The insignificant CCID/ROE 
relationship in our study is consistent with findings from Hackston and Milne (1996); Ho and Wong 
(2001); Hasseldine et al., (2005); while other studies like Haniffa and Cooke (2002) document a 
statistically significant relationship.  
Furthermore, we examine the relationship between leverage and the volume of CCID.  In 
contrast to our expectation, the results in Table 4 show a persistent and significant negative 
relationship between firm leverage and the volume of CCID. This indicates that highly leveraged 
firms disclose less CCI compared to less leveraged firms.  A possible explanation for the negative 
relationship is that creditors may be less concerned about CCIDs, which are not the core financial 
performance issue of primary importance to them. The result may also indicate that highly leveraged 
firms take strategic disclosure decisions, thereby making less CCIDs and focusing on other 
disclosures that may be of more concerns to their creditors. The relationship is significant at 1% and 
5% levels.  Finally, our results in model 1-4 in Table 4 seem to support our expectations of a positive 
relationship between the listing age of a firm and the volume of CCIDs. This indicates that older 
firms are more likely to make CCIDs than younger firms.  
4.3.5. CCID and other CSR disclosures.  
 
Consistent with our expectations, our results in models 3 and 4 in Table 4 show a significant 
positive relationship at 1% level, with a coefficient of 0.51 and 0.52 respectively, between the 
volume of CCID and other CSR disclosure. This implies that as disclosures of other CSR 
information increased in annual reports, information on CCI also increased which confirms our 
conjecture that CCID might have been motivated by the pressure on firms to disclose more social 
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responsibility information in their annual reports (Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Bebbington 
et al., 2008).  
 
 
4.4.Additional Analysis  
 
We subject our main findings in Table 4 to several robustness checks and additional analysis 
to enhance the reliability and rigour of our investigation; we present these below. 
 
4.4.1. Endogeneity check.  
 
First, previous studies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Ajinkya et al., 2005) cautioned on the 
susceptibility of CG research to endogeneity concerns. Empirical analyses invested with 
endogeneity problem report spurious regression results and lead to acceptance of hypotheses that 
should be rejected and vice versa (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). Endogeneity problem may arise due 
to feedback effect (simultaneity) or measurement error in the variables. Previous studies (e.g. 
Garcia-Castro et al., 2010) suggest the use of instrumental variables approach to check and fix this 
problem. However, identifying a suitable instrumental variable remains a formidable empirical 
challenge (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). In this study, we suspect that 
other CSR disclosure could be endogenous and therefore correlated with the error terms in our main 
regression. This violates the Gauss Markov theorem and the regression result will be spurious if this 
is the case (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). Greene (2008) provides an intuitive approach to testing for 
endogeneity, which involves two-stage regression processes that we followed in this study.  
In the first stage, the suspected endogenous variable is regressed on the instrumental variable 
and other exogenous variables in the model. We obtained the residual from this regression and used 
it in the second stage regression as an independent variable in addition to all other exogenous 
variables. The coefficient of the instrumental variable should be significant in the first stage 
regression and the predicted value of the residual (vhat) should not be significant in the second stage 
regression to rule out endogeneity problem. We used the rank of other CSR disclosure as our 
instrumental variable. Whilst this is likely to be correlated with other CSR disclosure, it is unlikely 
to be correlated with our dependent variable and the error terms in the main regression. Models 5 
and 6 in Table 5 present the results of this test. Rank is significant in the first stage regression and 
vhat is insignificant in the second stage regression, confirming the absence of endogeneity in our 
investigation and thereby reinforcing the findings reported in Table 4.  
 
[<<<<Table 5 about here>>>>] 
 
 
4.4.2. The effects of the financial crisis period  
 
In addition to the analyses above, we explored the effects of the financial crisis period on the 
volume of CCID disclosures. We partitioned our sample in several ways to tease out the various 
effects of the period on our investigation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Campello et al., 2010; 
Atkinson et al., 2013). Table 6 presents the results for the various time periods.  
 
[<<<<Table 6 about here>>>>] 
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Models 7a and 7b represent the regression results for the period before the crisis without lag 
and models 7c and 7d include a year lag. The results show positive relationships, although only 
marginal for models 7a and 7c and no significance for models 7b and 7d. Models 7b and 7d assume 
the crisis period started effectively in 2008.  Table 7 presents the fixed effect results for (during and 
after) the crisis periods. Models 8a and 8b represent the crisis period, with and without lag 
respectively and model 8c is the regression results - after the financial crisis. We observed a 
significant positive relationship between the volume of CCID and community expectations before 
and after the financial crisis. However, there was an insignificant negative relationship during the 
financial crisis period (2008-2010), and insignificant positive relationship when the period before 
the financial crisis covered up to 2007. It seems that corporate voluntary disclosure reflects the 
uncertainty of the period just before and during the financial crisis period whilst disclosure before 
and after the financial crisis seems to reflect firms’ responsiveness to the expectations of the 
community.  
The insignificant relationships shortly before and during the crisis period might suggest that, 
during these periods, corporations became more pre-occupied with their financial reports, in order 
to present a good financial outlook to the investors, rather than their CSR reports. Presenting a good 
financial outlook at such a critical period could help salvage the reputation of the firm than focusing 
on social disclosure. This seems to be the societal expectation at that time and confirms that firms 
adopt a strategic approach in responding to societal expectations. The crisis was no doubt a reflection 
that corporate behaviour fell below societal expectations and could be perceived to have created a 
legitimacy gap which firms responded to through increased disclosures. Similarly, the significant 
relationship after the crises might be indicative of increased disclosure of community activities in 
response to perceived expectation gap between corporate social performance as reported in the 
annual reports of companies and community expectations. However, overall, our results indicate a 
significant positive relationship between CCID and community expectations for the entire period of 
our investigation. 
  
[<<<<Table 7 about here>>>>] 
 
4.5.Other analysis   
 
We also consider the robustness of our result to alternative specification by changing the 
measure of firm size, using log of asset and log of total employee in place of market capitalisation, 
and return on capital employed as profitability measure in place of return on equity for firm 
performance. Our main results in Table 4 remain consistent and robust to these specifications.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examined the interactions between community expectations and corporate 
community involvement disclosures (CCID) in the annual reports of a sample of UK listed 
companies. This is a unique disclosure element in the annual reports of firms which has received 
little attention in the extant literature. We based our main conjecture on the media agenda-setting 
theory which suggests that there is a direct correlation between media coverage and issue salience 
in the public discourse. We argued that the media’s coverage of the CG and the financial crises 
inadvertently created public expectations of the corporations. This difference in expectations and 
behaviour is tantamount to a gap between the expectations of the conferring publics and firms’ 
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behaviour, which may threaten corporations’ continued legitimacy in the society.  Corporations have 
to respond to the gaps through effective communications with their conferring publics. A veritable 
medium of such communication is the annual reports of companies which is statutorily required. 
This study was based on the disclosures in 800 annual reports covering 2003 to 2012.   
We measured CCID as the volume of firms’ disclosures of their involvements in the ‘life’ of 
their communities of operations in the annual reports. Such disclosures have to be clearly stated and 
specifically related to firms’ community activities, sponsorship, granting local community access to 
firms’ resources including staff time and talents. They cover health, arts, education, recreations, 
amongst others. We based our measurement of community expectations on the media coverage of 
community issues in the major print and electronic media contained in the Lexis-Nexis Library for 
the period 2003-2012. Our FE regression model controlled for both CG and firm specific variables. 
Our empirical investigation involved a number of pre-estimation and post-estimation tests including 
endogeneity test which together enhanced the reliability of our findings.  
Our investigation reports a number of insightful results. We found a statistically significant 
positive relationship between community expectations and CCID. This result is persistent when 
expectations were treated contemporaneously and with a one-year lag. These results seem to indicate 
that firms treat their corporate disclosures strategically and take a conscious and calculated approach 
to respond to community expectations. The positive relationship between community expectations 
and CCID seems to show that firms increase corporate disclosure due to higher community 
expectations. Furthermore, these findings seem to imply that aggravated community expectations, 
precipitated by the inglorious CG and financial crises elicited increased disclosure by firms and they 
responded accordingly. This corporate response to aggravated community expectations may reflect 
the desire of corporations to maintain and retain their societal legitimacy especially during severe 
uncertainty that pervaded the periods of these crises.  
Moreover, we found a consistent and statistically significant negative relationship between 
firm leverage and CCID. This result is in contrast with some of the notable findings in the literature 
regarding the nexus between voluntary disclosure and leverage (Mangena and Pike, 2005; Tsamenyi 
et al., 2007; Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). Expected positive relationship between leverage and 
voluntary disclosure is based on the perception that creditors prefer additional corporate information 
to less, and that firms could benefit from reduced costs of capital by making important voluntary 
disclosure. However, our finding of an inverse relationship between CCID and leverage seems to 
suggest that the relationship between leverage and voluntary disclosure depends on the importance 
of such disclosure to the creditors from the perceptions of the firm. Whilst additional CCID may be 
invaluable to community stakeholders it may be less so to creditors who may give higher preference 
to voluntary financial information.  
Our findings advance the broad CSR theoretical foundation by exploring the role of the media 
in CCID. In particular, we introduce the media agenda-setting theory to mainstream CCID research. 
Our findings seem to support the media agenda theoretical expectation that increase in media 
coverage of an issue aggravates community expectations and firms respond to these perceived 
expectations through increased corporate disclosure.  Our study therefore provides a fresh theoretical 
perspective to the broad CSR debate and especially the CCI subset of this debate.  In addition to this 
necessary theoretical breadth, our findings have managerial implications. Firstly, a positive 
relationship between community expectation and CCID highlights the responsiveness of 
corporations to their community stakeholders over a period of grave uncertainty. This may be crucial 
to the establishment of a long term sustainable relationship between the firm and its conferring 
publics. Corporations should respond effectively to their conferring publics because poor 
communications may create expectation gaps which may worsen overtime. Secondly, media agenda 
setting argued that irrespective of the potential to self-select media representations by firms, media 
outlets make strategic decision on news items to feature and how to frame them in their limited 
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space. Therefore, management should genuinely engage with their conferring publics which can 
foster community support and access to community resource.  
This study focused mainly on the disclosure in the annual reports and it may be possible that 
additional insight could be gained if other corporate communication media are explored. Thus, 
future studies could explore corporate communication such as standalone CSR report or press 
releases and earnings announcements. Also the analyses in this study is limited to the impacts of 
community expectation (through media coverage) on corporate disclosure; an intricate but 
interesting line of future enquiry could be to explore whether and how corporate disclosure in turn 
impacts media coverage of community related issues, especially given that the media are also subject 
to societal legitimacy.  Furthermore, this study focused only on the UK FTSE 350 context and 
although it provides additional information from other context aside the US, it will be useful to 
explore CCID and the impact of the media in generating community expectation in other jurisdiction 
with less transparent and free press, such as in developing economies.  
 
 
 
Notes 
1. We used the term ‘community of operation’ to refer broadly to the immediate and remote, 
physical and non-physical environments in which a firm operates. In other words, it encompasses 
all the conceivable stakeholders of a firm.    
2. Some studies argue that larger board may become dysfunctional and that board decision making 
may become sluggish due to protracted deliberation and effort loss. Smaller board are suggested 
to be able to reach decisions faster and compact in operation (Yermack, 1996; Song and 
Windram, 2004). 
3. As with many CG variables, we recognise that other studies such as Eng and Mak (2003) reports 
negative relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure and studies such as 
Ho and Wong (2001) do not find any relationship at all between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure.  
4. Our inter-coder score was well over the threshold of 0.80 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: List of UK National and Regional News Papers 
 
UK NATIONALS:  
Content-Summary: The UK Nationals contains 16 full-text national newspapers distributed throughout the UK. However, 
only UK National News Papers with relevant articles on CSR and CCI issues, during the period under investigation, are 
listed below. 
1. Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday                     8.  The Independent (London) 
2. Independent on Sunday                                  9.  The Observer 
3. Morning Star                                                  10. The Sunday Express 
4. The Business                                                  11. The Sunday Telegraph (London) 
5. The Daily Telegraph (London)                      12. The Sunday Times (London) 
6. The Express                                                    13. The Times (London) 
7. The Guardian (London)                                   
 
UK Regional Publications:  
Content-Summary: The UK Regional publications contain all the regional sources published in the UK held by 
LexisNexis. However, only UK Regional publications with relevant articles on CSR and CCI issues, during the period 
under investigation are listed below: 
1. Aberdeen Evening Express                            16.   Daily Post (Liverpool) 
2. Aberdeen Press & Journal                              17.   Daily Record  
3. Bath Chronicle                                                18.   Derby Evening Telegraph  
4. Belfast News Letter                                        19.    Evening Chronicle (Newcastle) 
5. Berwick Advertiser                                         20.    Evening Gazette 
6. Belfast Telegraph                                            21.   Evening Herald (Plymouth) 
7.  Birmingham Evening Mail                            22.   Evening News (Edinburgh) 
8. Birmingham Post                                            23.   Evening Times (Glasgow) 
9. Bristol Evening Post                                       24.   Express & Echo (Exeter) 
10. Business and Finance                                     25.   Fife Free Press 
11. Carmarthen Journal                                        26.   Fosse Way Magazine 
12. Chester Chronicle                                           27.   Gloucestershire Echo 
13. Cornish Guardian                                           28.    Grimsby Evening Telegraph 
14. Coventry Evening Telegraph                         29.   Hertfordshire Mercury 
15. Croydon Advertiser                                        30.   Huddersfield Daily Examiner 
 
UK Regional Publications Cont’d:  
31. Hull Daily Mail                                           57.   The Herald (Glasgow) 
32. Irish News                                                   58.  The Independent - Business & Money 
33.  Kent and Sussex Courier                            59. The Journal (Newcastle, UK) 
34. Kidderminster Shuttle                                 60. The Northern Echo 
35. Leicester Mercury                                       61.  The Scotsman 
36. Liverpool Daily Echo                                  62.  The Sentinel (Stoke) 
37. Loughborough Echo                                    63.  The Sunday Herald 
38. Manchester Evening News                          64.  The Sunderland Echo 
39. Melton Times                                               65.  The Times Educational Supplement 
40. Metro (UK)                                                  66.  The Times Higher Education Supplement 
41. Mid Devon Gazette                                      67.  The Warsaw Voice 
42. Middlesbrough Evening Gazette                  68.  The West Briton 
43. North Devon Journal                                    69.  The Western Mail 
44. Nottingham Evening Post                            70.   This is Brighton & Hove 
45. Peterborough Evening Telegraph                71.   This is Essex 
46.   Retford Times series                                  72.  This is Hampshire 
47. Scarborough Evening News                        73.  This is Local London 
48. Scotland on Sunday                                     74.  This is NorthEast 
49. Scunthorpe Evening Telegraph                   75.  Watford Observer 
50. South Wales Echo                                       76.   Western Daily Press 
51. South Wales Evening Post                          77.  Western Gazette series 
52. Southern Reporter                                       78.   Western Morning News (Plymouth) 
53. Sunday Business                                         79.  Western People 
54. The Cornishman                                          80. Yeovil Express 
55. The Evening Standard (London)                 81. Yorkshire Evening Post 
56. The Gloucester Citizen                                82.  Yorkshire Post 
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Appendix B: Hausman Test   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       72.11
                 chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         age      .1689744    -.0010697        .1700442        .0250013
         lev     -.0094771    -.0046601        -.004817        .0016834
         roe     -.0030124     .0050462       -.0080586        .0011857
        lnmv      .3588276     .2857775        .0730501        .0318669
      lnocsr       .516178      .689335       -.1731569        .0265886
        csrc     -.1553255     .0501385        -.205464        .0704178
          dc      -.799401    -.4204397       -.3789613        .0714062
          rc     -.0983218     .0652503       -.1635722        .1000007
          bs      -.008624    -.0222605        .0136365        .0182572
          bc      1.359539      1.77731       -.4177712        .2734209
          bm      .0386875     .0476217       -.0089342        .0071939
laglncomnews     -.2905461     .0568203       -.3473665        .0401424
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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Table 1: Definition of variables:  
 
Variables Definitions 
  
CCID Volume of CCID based on word count 
COMNEWS Media coverage on community issues (word count) 
BODMET Defined as the number of board meetings in a year. 
BODCOMP Defined as the proportion of total independent non-executive directors to total 
directors on the board. 
BODSIZ Defined as the total number of directors on the board 
RISKCOM Standalone Risk committee, measured as dichotomous variable where 1 = Presence 
of Risk committee and 0 = otherwise 
DISCOM Disclosure committee, measured as dichotomous variable where 1 = Presence of a 
disclosure committee and 0 = otherwise 
CSRCOM CSR committee, measured as dichotomous variable where 1 = Presence of CSR 
committee and 0 = otherwise 
OTHCSRD Word count of other CSR disclosures e.g. environmental, human resources etc. 
MCAP Market capitalisation: measures firm size and is obtained from DataStream with 
mnemonic code MV 
ROE Return on Equity: measures the financial performance of firms and is obtained from 
DataStream with mnemonic code (WC08301)  
LEV Defines the gearing ratio – the corporations’ exposure to short and long term risk and 
is measured by the ratio of total debt to total capital. (WC08221) 
AGE Listing age 
  
    *All data were sourced from company’s annual reports, Thompson Reuter DataStream and Lexis Library. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Std Dev Min Max 
     
CCID 476.11 496.41 0 3271 
COMNEWS 7310 2658 3629 12844 
BODMET 8.348 2.647 3 16 
BODCOMP 0.623 0.137 0 0.93 
BODSIZ 10.19 2.896 5 18 
CSRCOM 0.333 0.471 0 1 
DISCOM 0.220 0.415 0 1 
RISKCOM 0.313 0.464 0 1 
OTHCSRD  1880 1547 0 12400 
MCAP (£’m) 9,024 19,639.88 6.955 162,838.5 
ROE (%) 15.852 17.661 -25.32 53.42 
LEV (%) 39.04 25.74 0 98.8 
Age (yrs) 22.15 18.76 1 66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix of all IVs 
 
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. COMNEWS 1.000            
2. BODMET 0.118 1.000           
3. BODCOMP 0.139 -0.086 1.000          
4. BODSIZ 0.034 0.016 0.204 1.000         
5. CSRCOM 0.098 0.108 0.170 0.250 1.000        
6. DISCOM 0.134 0.150 0.229 0.346 0.317 1.000       
7. RISCOM 0.069 0.057 0.064 0.064 0.074 0.176 1.000      
8. OTHCSRD  0.295 0.222 0.173 0.273 0.317 0.288 0.106 1.000     
9.MCAP 0.023 0.100 0.164 0.537 0.115 0.274 0.017 0.208 1.000    
10. ROE  0.112 0.086 0.029 0.061 0.136 0.164 0.025 0.160 0.165 1.000   
11. LEV 0.030 0.070 0.062 0.195 0.113 0.092 0.069 0.157 0.037 0.116 1.000  
12. Age (yrs) 0.081 0.096 0.037 0.209 0.114 0.123 0.101 1.273 0.226 0.117 0.217 1.000 
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Table 4: Fixed Effect Regression Results (Dependent variable [DV]: LnCCID) 
 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VIF 
With 
LnCOMNEWS 
With 1-year Lag 
LnCOMNEWS 
With 
LnCOMNEWS 
& OTHCSRD 
With 1-year Lag 
LnCOMNEWS & 
OTHCSRD 
    
 Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat) 
LnCOMNEWS† 0.640 (4.32) *** 0.279 (1.99) ** 0.592 (4.17) *** 0.285 (2.15) ** 1.05 
BODMET 0.048 (1.85) * 0.043 (1.67) * 0.037 (1.47)  0.038 (1.53)  1.10 
BODCOMP 1.573 (2.61) *** 1.837 (2.95) *** 1.302 (2.28) ** 1.408 (2.38) ** 1.15 
BODSIZ 0.016 (0.46) 0.001 (0.02) 0.002 (0.05) -0.011 (-0.33) 1.71 
CSRCOMa -0.072 (-0.41) -0.113 (-0.65) -0.097 (-0.58) -0.155 (-0.94) 1.22 
DISCOMa -1.046 (-5.51) 
*** 
-0.979 (-5.09) 
*** 
-0.879 (-4.81) 
*** 
-0.804 (-4.37) 
*** 
1.40 
RISKCOMa -0.273 (-1.42) -0.238 (-1.19) -0.153 (-0.83) -0.106 (-0.55) 1.07 
LnOTHCSRD†   0.505 (8.18) *** 0.516 (8.46) *** 1.43 
Ln MCAP† 0.557 (10.27) *** 0.502 (8.33) *** 0.438 (8.12) *** 0.363 (6.09) *** 2.44 
ROE -0.014 (-2.35) ** -0.009 (-1.48) -0.009 (-1.61) -0.006 (-1.05) 1.09 
LEV -0.009 (-2.59) 
*** 
-0.011 (-3.11) 
*** -0.008 (-2.24) ** 
-0.011 (-2.91) 
*** 
1.12 
AGE  0.329 (14.34) *** 0.255 (10.29) *** 0.231 (9.26) *** 0.169 (6.60) *** 1.24 
Constant -1.276 (-1.01) -2.259 (-1.74) * -1.987 (-1.64) -2.633 (-2.13) **  
      
Adjusted R2   0.597 0.571 0.631 0.614  
 F test  14.030 *** 11.624 *** 15.915 *** 13.573 ***  
N 793 719 793 719  
Notes: This table reports the results of our examination of the effect of Community Expectation measured by media 
coverage on community issues on Community Involvement Disclosures estimated as LnCCIDit = α0 + 
β1LnCOMNEWSit-1 + β2BODMETit + β3BODCOMPit + β4BODSIZit + β5RISKCOMit + β6DISCOMit + 
β7CSRCOMit + β8LnOTHCSRDit + β9LnMCAPit + β10ROEit + β11LEVit + β12AGEit + Єit 
(p > 0.10) = Not Significant 
*(p ≤ 0.10) = Significant at 10% 
**(p ≤ 0.05) = Significant at 5% 
***(p ≤ 0.01) = Significant at 1% 
a Dichotomous variable where 1 = presence of and 0 = absence of.           
†Ln stands for Log transformed variables 
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Table 5: 2SLS Regression Results 
 
 
Variables 
Model 5 (DV: LnOTHCSRD) Model 6 (DV: LnCCID) 
First stage regression Second stage regression 
  
 Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat) 
   
1-yr lag LnCOMNEWS† 0.054 (-0.73) 0.282 (-2.13) ** 
BODMET 0.010 (0.75) 0.044 (1.80) * 
BODCOMP 0.549 (1.68) * 1.377 (2.34) ** 
BODSIZ 0.008 (0.43) -0.009 (-0.28) 
DISCOMa -0.262 (-2.61) *** -0.811 (-4.46) *** 
RISKCOMa -0.149 (-1.42) -0.109 (-0.57) 
LnOTHCSRD†  0.513 (8.39) *** 
LnMCAP† 0.180 (5.61) *** 0.353 (5.96) *** 
ROE -0.002 (-1.31) -0.003 (-0.81) 
LEV -0.001 (-0.46) -0.010 (-2.99) *** 
AGE  0.047 (3.15) *** 0.162 (6.42) *** 
rank 0.003 (15.43) ***  
Vhat   0.29(1.56) 
 
Adjusted R2 Within 0.533 0.403 
                      Between  0.458 0.064  
                      Overall  0.421 0.076 
 F- test       65.29*** 38.66*** 
N 720 720 
Notes: This table reports the results of the two stage least square regression analysis to test for endogeneity problems; 
where CCIDit = α0 + β1COMNEWSit-1 + β2BODMETit + β3BODCOMPit + β4BODSIZit + β5RISKCOMit + 
β6DISCOMit + β9LnMCAPit + β10ROEit + β11LEVit + β12AGEit + Єit 
(p > 0.10) = Not Significant 
*(p ≤ 0.10) = Significant at 10% 
**(p ≤ 0.05) = Significant at 5% 
***(p ≤ 0.01) = Significant at 1% 
***Significant at 1% = (p ≤ 0.01),  
a Dichotomous variable where 1 = presence of and 0 = absence of.           
†Ln stands for Log transformed variables 
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Table 6: Regression results for before the financial crises (DV: LnCCID) 
 
 
Variables 
Model 7a Model 7b Model 7c Model 7d 
 
2004-2005 
 
2004-2007 
2004-2005 with       
1-year lag 
LnCOMNEWS 
2004-2007 with 1-
year lag 
LnCOMNEWS 
    
 Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat) Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat) 
     
LnCOMNEWS 8.688 (1.95) * 0.756 (1.09) 10.425 (1.95) * 0.213 (0.28) 
BODMET -0.105 (-0.80) 0.023 (0.38) -0.105 (-0.80) 0.020 (0.32) 
BODCOMP -3.352 (-1.10) 2.441 (2.08) ** -3.352 (-1.10) 2.436 (2.07) ** 
BODSIZ -0.123 (-0.59) 0.071 (1.00) -0.123 (-0.59) 0.074 (1.05) 
CSRCOMa -0.257 (-0.37) -0.286 (-0.82) -0.257 (-0.37) -0.295 (-0.85) 
DISCOMa -1.018 (-1.31) -0.825 (-2.35) ** -1.018 (-1.31) -0.837 (-2.38) ** 
RISKCOMa 0.503 (0.71) 0.340 (0.84) 0.503 (0.71) 0.344 (0.85) 
LnOTHCSRD 0.053 (0.22) 0.415 (3.61) *** 0.053 (0.22) 0.420 (3.64) *** 
LnMCAP† 0.616 (2.85) *** 0.371 (2.71) *** 0.616 (2.85) *** 0.365 (2.66) *** 
ROE -0.035 (-2.39) ** -0.015 (-1.79) * -0.035 (-2.39) ** -0.015 (-1.76) * 
LEV -0.058 (-2.47) ** -0.003 (-0.45) -0.059 (-2.47) ** -0.003 (-0.39) 
AGE  -1.583 (-1.47) 0.345 (3.25) *** -1.583 (-1.47) ** 0.416 (5.02) *** 
Constant 112.81 (1.88) * -3.038 (-0.396) -55.02 (-2.04) ** -12.92 (-1.91) * 
     
Adjusted R2   0.765 0.676 0.765 0.674 
 F- test       6.688 *** 8.316 *** 6.688 *** 8.263 *** 
N 160 320 160 320 
Notes: This table reports the results of our examination of the effect of Community Expectation measured by media 
coverage on community issues on Community Involvement Disclosures estimated as CCIDit = α0 + β1COMNEWSit-1 
+ β2BODMETit + β3BODCOMPit + β4BODSIZit + β5RISKCOMit + β6DISCOMit + β7CSRCOMit + β8OTHCSRDit + 
β9LnMCAPit + β10ROEit + β11LEVit + β12AGEit + Єit 
(p > 0.10) = Not Significant 
*(p ≤ 0.10) = Significant at 10% 
**(p ≤ 0.05) = Significant at 5% 
***(p ≤ 0.01) = Significant at 1% 
***Significant at 1% = (p ≤ 0.01),  
a Dichotomous variable where 1 = presence of and 0 = absence of.           
†Ln stands for Log transformed variables 
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Table 7: Regression results for during and after the financial crises (DV: LnCCID) 
 
 
Variables 
Model 8a Model 8b Model 8c 
During crisis         
2008-2010 with 
LnCOMNEWS 
During crisis         
2008-2010 with           
1-year lag of 
LnCOMNEWS  
After the financial 
crisis (2011-2012) 
   
 Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat)  Coeff (t-stat) 
    
LnCOMNEWS -0.325 (-1.00) -0.029 (-0.17) 4.260 (2.125) ** 
BODMET 0.037 (1.38) 0.035 (1.30) 0.038 (1.420) 
BODCOMP 1.454 (1.41) 1.323 (1.29) 0.400 (0.260) 
BODSIZ 0.000 (0.01) -0.003 (-0.06) -0.030 (-0.505) 
CSRCOMa -0.246 (-1.18) -0.280 (-1.35)  
DISCOMa 0.291 (0.91) 0.298 (0.92) 0.131 (0.223) 
RISKCOMa -0.130 (-0.44) -0.204 (-0.72) 0.060 (0.100) 
LnOTHCSRD 0.423 (3.48) *** 0.419 (3.44) *** 0.907 (4.222) *** 
LnMCAP† -0.142 (-0.78) -0.137 (-0.73) -0.242 (-2.011) ** 
ROE 0.005 (1.28) 0.005 (1.27) -0.002 (-0.743) 
LEV -0.001 (-0.28) -0.001 (-0.26) -0.005 (-0.839) 
AGE  0.218 (1.04) 0.020 (0.32) 0.714 (2.089) ** 
Constant 0.360 (0.15) 2.588 (1.47)  
    
Adjusted R2   0.742 0.740 0.811 
 F- test       8.546 *** 8.479 *** 8.568*** 
N 240 240 160 
Notes: This table reports the results of our examination of the effect of Community Expectation measured by media 
coverage on community issues on Community Involvement Disclosures estimated as CCIDit = α0 + β1COMNEWSit-1 
+ β2BODMETit + β3BODCOMPit + β4BODSIZit + β5RISKCOMit + β6DISCOMit + β7CSRCOMit + β8OTHCSRDit + 
β9LnMCAPit + β10ROEit + β11LEVit + β12AGEit + Єit 
(p > 0.10) = Not Significant 
*(p ≤ 0.10) = Significant at 10% 
**(p ≤ 0.05) = Significant at 5% 
***(p ≤ 0.01) = Significant at 1% 
***Significant at 1% = (p ≤ 0.01),  
a Dichotomous variable where 1 = presence of and 0 = absence of.           
†Ln stands for Log transformed variables 
